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Abstract
In order to gain more insight into the relationship between housing prices and mortgage
lending, we estimate models for both the Dutch housing and the mortgage market. The
empirical analysis presented in this paper offers support for the hypothesis that in the
Netherlands housing prices and mortgage lending are interdependent. According to our
model, housing prices were influenced by changes in bank lending criteria during the
estimation period, even when we control for variables such as disposable household
income, mortgage interest rate, demographic developments and the housing stock.
Mortgage lending was found to be dependent on housing prices as well as disposable
income. Our analysis further suggests that in the short run housing prices can deviate
substantially from their long-run equilibrium value.
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1.  Introduction
A dependency of households on bank credit points in the direction of a credit channel in
which bank lending influences real economic activity through changing housing prices.
External shocks, like rapid deregulation or a change in monetary policy, will influence
banks’ lending conditions and therefore the severity of households’ credit constraints. An
expansionary monetary policy, and the accompanying lower interest rates, can for
instance lead to higher collateral values. This will enable households to attract more
credit and even to cash part of the surplus value of their house, since higher collateral
values make the problem of asymmetric information less critical to banks. Expectations
about continuing housing price rises may induce banks to relax their lending standards
even further, thereby leading to a self-perpetuating process of increasing property values
and higher credit. Such periods of rising property prices and higher credit granting are not
only of consequence for monetary policy, but also have important implications for
supervisory policies, as both households and banks become more vulnerable to a fall in
housing prices. Lower property values will again bring to the fore the problem of
asymmetric information, as banks will no longer rely mainly on (excess) collateral, but
are forced to focus again on the expected repayment capacity of their clients. A squeeze
of the credit supply may be the result.
In this paper, we shall examine the currently soaring Dutch housing prices and the
accompanying rapid credit expansion. To put this case into perspective we will briefly
revisit two earlier and quite similar European cases of rapidly rising housing prices and
the associated role of bank loans: the Nordic banking crisis, and the boom and bust on the
UK housing market. In paragraph 2 we first pay attention to some important theoretical
notions. Then, in paragraph 3, we briefly discuss both the Nordic case and the UK case in
a descriptive manner. Paragraph 4 presents some general information with regard to the
modelling of housing prices, followed by an empirical analysis on the relationship
between housing prices and credit-availability in the Netherlands in paragraph 5. Finally,
paragraph 6 concludes.-    - 2
2.  Housing prices, bank credit and consumption
When a household buys a house, it will typically be dependent on a financial institution
like a bank from which it can borrow a substantial portion of the needed funds. Most
households will not be able to raise money from other sources: banks are “special” to
them. However, when granting loans, banks will be faced with asymmetric information:
they only have limited insight into the financial prospects and moral rectitude of potential
borrowers. To reduce these informational shortcomings, banks will screen households
before granting credit, hoping that in doing so they will be able to avoid the worst risks.
Additionally, they will demand households to pledge collateral, usually in the form of the
house that is to be financed (mortgage loan). The pledging of collateral significantly
reduces moral hazard behaviour, since households know that if they are unable to meet
their redemption and interest payments, the bank will be entitled to sell the house and use
the proceeds to reclaim its funds.
The so-called balance sheet channel, which is part of the credit view of monetary
transmission, describes how changing interest rates can influence the credit supply of
banks by affecting the net worth of both firms and households.1 A higher interest rate, for
instance, can decrease the net worth of households, since households’ real debt burden
will increase and housing prices (collateral value) will come down.2  Furthermore, the
higher interest rate will also increase interest payments. Together, these effects may
aggravate the consequences of asymmetric information, ultimately leading to a reduction
in the supply of credit to households.3 External shocks, like a change in monetary policy,
can thus start a process in which changing housing prices influence the credit supply by
banks. In turn, these changes in credit availability may influence housing prices.
Additionally, an increase in interbank competition (for example due to deregulation) can
lead banks to focus on gaining market share rather than profit maximisation. During such
adjustment processes, overshooting of credit markets is a well-known phenomenon in
1 Bernanke & Gertler, 1995. In the remainder of this paper we will focus on households.
2 A household’s net worth is to a large extent made up of the housing value minus its outstanding mortgage debt (also
termed surplus value).
3 Besides the balance sheet channel, the credit view also highlights the so-called bank lending channel, which stresses
the importance of the adaptation of banks’ balance sheets in reaction to a shift in monetary policy. Both the bank-    - 3
which the pricing of risk is inadequate. Expected increases in collateral values will also
lead to a decline in the perceived risk (Herring and Wachter, 1999). Banks may even start
to display disaster myopia behaviour: the probability of low-frequency shocks like a real
estate crash is underestimated, especially when the time period since the last real estate
collapse gets longer (Guttentag and Herring, 1984).
Periods of rapid credit expansion may not only influence  housing prices but also
macroeconomic variables like consumption and inflation. Firstly, higher housing prices
can lead to wealth effects: house-owning households will start to feel wealthier because
of the increased housing prices and will therefore spend a higher proportion of their
income on consumption (decreasing propensity to save). Secondly, some households will
start to cash part of their surplus value by taking out new mortgage credit. This so-called
withdrawn equity can then be consumed. However, such periods of credit and housing
booms can end abruptly when a certain trigger, e.g. a tightening of monetary policy,
reverses this vicious circle. Lower collateral values and increasing uncertainty may then
prompt banks to shrink their credit supply, thereby (further) depressing housing prices:
the disaster myopia turns into disaster magnification (Herring and Wachter, 1999).
Wealth effects and equity withdrawal will start to work in the opposite direction,
resulting in lower consumption. Ultimately, economic activity will be slowed down by
means of the same channels that were preponderant during the preceding boom period.
3.  The macroeconomic importance of housing and mortgages: two European cases
During the 1980s and 1990s a number of European countries were hit by financial
instability relating (at least in part) to housing and mortgage markets, namely the United
Kingdom and three Scandinavian countries. While each boom-bust cycle had its own
peculiar features, they nonetheless shared some remarkable similarities. All four
countries experienced a period of rapid financial deregulation in the 1980s, prior to the
boom.4  Before deregulation, credit rationing had led to substantial excess demand for
                                                                                                                                                
lending channel and the balance sheet channel stress the way in which monetary policy influences the supply of bank
credit, while the traditional money view focuses on the demand for bank credit.
4 In 1980 the Bank of England discontinued the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme which had required banks to
place a certain amount of interest-free deposits with the central bank. In 1981 the Bank also abolished the Reserve-    - 4
credit (Miles, 1992; Callen and Lomax, 1990; Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). In the UK
this was the result of an informal cartel of building societies that ruled the mortgage
market. In Scandinavia, banks were effectively sheltered from competition from other
domestic and foreign financial institutions, which allowed them to be highly selective in
choosing credit risks. After deregulation of the financial markets, both the amount of
mortgage credit and the (real) mortgage interest rate rose in these countries, reflecting the
excess demand that had been present for many years. Adding to this effect, which
basically reflected the achievement of a new equilibrium, was an additional increase in
credit demand, pushing up real mortgages rates even further. This credit demand was
induced by very optimistic expectations of households. In the UK an increasing interest
for new products like small and second mortgages also played a role, while in
Scandinavia demand for credit was enhanced by a generous tax deductibility of interest
expenses.
The resulting rapid build-up of household debt was accompanied by a spectacular
increase in housing prices. Apparently, the growing value of collateral subsequently
made the problems associated with informational asymmetries (seemingly) less serious to
banks, which prompted them to extend even more credit. Furthermore, fierce competition
on the mortgage market led to an erosion of the quality standards used: banks started to
use higher loan-to-value ratio’s. Meanwhile, the combination of rising housing prices and
less strict credit constraints resulted in a boost of consumption, as consumers (partly)
cashed in the surplus value of their house.
By the late 1980s or early 1990s the whole process reversed. Monetary tightening
increased interest payments of households, compounded in Scandinavia by the abolition
of the tax deductibility of interest expenses. Households’ net worth decreased or even
turned negative because of the sharp reduction in housing prices. Furthermore, many
                                                                                                                                                
Asset ratio, a liquidity requirement. In addition,  in 1983 the Building Societies’ Association decided to no longer
recommend rates to be charged on mortgages and started to allow building societies to borrow increasingly from the
money markets, whereas they were previously restricted to lend on their customers’ deposits only (Sargent, 1991, and
Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997). In Norway, supplementary reserve requirements were abolished in 1984, while interest
rate declarations were removed in 1985. Important deregulation measures in Sweden included the abandoning of the
system of liquidity ratios for banks in 1983 and lifting the ceilings on bank lending and restrictions on bank lending-    - 5
households were confronted with lower than expected incomes. Households began to
consolidate their financial positions by cutting back on consumption. As a result, the
economies plunged into a deep recession. In addition to this initial demand shock the
Scandinavian countries, particularly Finland, suffered from a collapse of the trade with
the former countries of the USSR (Vihriälä, 1997). Personal bankruptcies rose, putting
bank’s balance sheets under pressure. In Scandinavia, the financial problems in the
private sector (including the corporate sector) reached such a level that a full banking
crisis ensued.
From these two cases it is evident that housing and mortgage markets play a crucial role
in financial stability, in the sense that problems may spill over into the real economy. In
the remainder of this paper we will concentrate on the Netherlands, where the present
situation with regard to housing prices, mortgage lending and consumption appears to
resemble the upward cycle in the UK and Scandinavia in the 1980s to a certain degree.
Our main focus will be the relation between housing prices and mortgage lending.
However, before setting up a model, we will first discuss the different ways in which
housing prices in general, and the role played by mortgage credit in particular, have been
modelled in previous research.
4.  Modelling of housing prices and mortgage credit
There exists a large body of both theoretical and empirical literature describing housing
prices. Traditional models of housing prices consist of a stock-flow model in which
markets clear quickly and prices adjust to equate the demand for housing with the
existing stock. Prices are directly derived from a demand and supply function.5 However,
these models, like the stock-adjustment framework developed by Muth (1960), lack a
satisfactory micro foundation. An important strand of literature therefore started to view
houses as an investment asset that provides the owner with a stream of housing services.6
                                                                                                                                                
rates in 1985. In Finland, amongst other measures, restrictions on average lending rates were abolished in 1986 (Drees
and Pazarbasioglu, 1998).
5 With housing supply assumed fixed (infinitely inelastic) in the short run, a housing price equation was often
constructed by inverting the demand function (see for instance Hendry, 1984).
6 See for this so-called asset market approach Breedon and Joyce (1993), Holly and Jones (1997), Brown et al. (1997),
Barot and Takala (1998) and the seminal paper by Poterba (1984).-    - 6
The fundamental value of a house can then be seen as the present discounted value of the
real (expected) housing services the house will provide over time. In this literature,
models generally describe a representative household that solves an intertemporal
optimisation problem involving two goods: housing services and a composite
consumption good, which are both part of the utility function. Apart from housing there is
one other non-housing asset. The household maximises utility over time, taking into
account its budget constraint and some technical constraints, describing the evolution of
the stock of housing and non-housing assets. By doing so, it ensures that the marginal
rate of substitution between housing services and the flow of utility from consumption
(uh/uc) will equate both the real user cost of housing and the real rental price of housing in
capital market equilibrium (Rt):







Ø + - - = d p 1
The variables included in the real user costs of housing term are the interest rate (i), the
marginal rate of income tax (t), the expected real capital gains on housing (ph
e), the rate
of depreciation (d) and the real housing price (rph).7 It is the real housing price which
must now bring about capital market equilibrium. The real rental price (Rt), which equals
the amount of money that has to be given to a household to compensate for the loss of
one “housing unit”, is unobservable: it is proxied by the demand for and supply of
housing services. Therefore, the real rental price will be a function of real income (ry),
the housing stock (H) and demographic variables (DEMO)8:
(2) ( ) DEMO H ry f Rt , , =
By substituting out for Rt in (1) we can now express the real housing price in terms of
real income, demographic variables, housing stock and the user cost of housing
7  See also Barot and Takala (1998), p. 12. The real user cost of housing includes an expected price term and is
therefore endogenous. In empirical testing the expected capital gains on housing are often proxied by lags in housing
price appreciation (Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997).
8 Breedon and Joyce (1993) for instance, in the tradition of the Bank of England’s model of the early 1990s, represent
demography by the proportion of the population aged 25-29, a prime house buying group.-    - 7
(logarithmic notation). Note that when we assume the existing housing stock fixed in the
short-term, the resulting model of housing prices is simply an inverted demand function
and is close to the traditional reduced form specification that can be derived from
equating particular housing demand and supply schedules and solving for housing prices
(Pain and Westaway, 1997). Usually, housing price models include the ratio between
some measure of demography and the housing stock, which we represent for the moment
as ln(DEMO/H). Thus, the housing price is related to (excess) demand rather than
demand for or supply of housing per se.












Note that in the discussion until now, no theoretical reason has been given for including a
mortgage credit variable in equation (3). This means that thus far it has implicitly been
assumed that there are no credit market constraints, meaning that only the market price,
i.e. the mortgage interest rate, is relevant to households.9 The mortgage interest rate is
already included in (3) as an element of the user costs of housing. However, it is very
likely that not only the price but also the volume of the mortgage market will be of
interest to house buyers. After all, as was pointed out in the paragraph 2, households can
generally not borrow as much as they desire at the prevailing mortgage rate. Therefore,
one can test for the importance of credit rationing10 as a result of information
asymmetries by including a mortgage variable. Hendry (1984) and Hakfoort and
Matysiak (1997) use, for instance, the outstanding mortgage stock as a proxy for
mortgage rationing, while Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) proxy changes in mortgage
lending by the rate of acceleration of the log mortgage stock.  Other credit rationing
variables that are often used include loan-to-value ratio’s for first time buyers (Dicks,
1990, and Pain and Westaway, 1997) and the difference between an appropriate interbank
rate and the average mortgage rate (Pain and Westaway, 1997). For the time being we
will label the different mortgage variables “ln(MOR)”:
9 Demand influences are assumed to be completely reflected in the mortgage interest rate.
10 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Meen (1990) shows that the existence of credit market constraints implies that the user
costs of housing increase with the ratio of the shadow price of the rationing constraint to the marginal utility of the-    - 8












Both Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and Hendry (1984) recognise that households do
not possess all relevant knowledge of the mortgage and housing market and all the
variables that influence it. The rational expectations assumption might therefore be too
strong. On the one hand it can be expected that households will have at least some
information about these markets, housing being one of the biggest expenditures in their
life. On the other hand, however, the very fact that most households buy a house only
once or twice in their lifetime adds to the doubtfulness with regard to the quality of their
decision making process. Therefore, “sensible” (Hendry, 1984) or “semi-rational”
(Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997) expectations are often assumed, which means that these
expectations are neither persistently wrong nor fully efficient. Available sources of
information can for instance be interest rates, the volume of mortgage lending and also
lagged values of housing prices. DiPasquale and Wheaton (1994) note that the housing
market has a somewhat predictable cycle with positive serial correlation: housing prices
do not follow a random walk but exhibit significant serial correlation. This implies that
not only the supply side of the housing market adjusts gradually, due to the housing stock
being fixed in the short term, but also the demand side.11 Such a gradual price adjustment
process holds when households develop expectations by looking backward at historic
prices. Case and Shiller (1988) show for instance that extrapolating behaviour (backward
looking expectations) is common in housing markets. During booms home buyers expect
further housing price rises and are worried about not being able to buy a house in the
future market.12 13
                                                                                                                                                
composite good. However, this quantity is unmeasurable, and therefore excess demand is often proxied by measures
such as the stock of mortgages outstanding.
11 DiPasquale and Wheaton assume the following price adjustment mechanism, in which  P* is the hypothetical
equilibrium price and t is the (quarterly) percentage rate at which actual prices converge to this equilibrium price:
P} * t{P ?P - =
12 Levin and Wright (1997) proxy expectations of future changes in real housing prices by past changes in real housing
prices and conclude that that housing price movements are systematically related to historical housing price movements
which they interpret as being caused by speculation. Extrapolating behaviour seems to be confirmed by the results of a
recent survey held by De Nederlandsche Bank (2000), which shows that 57% of  all Dutch households with a mortgage
loan think that the fundamental value of their house is less than the current market value, when 60% of this population-    - 9
5.  An empirical investigation into the Dutch housing and mortgage markets
5.1 Introduction
In recent years the Dutch mortgage market has displayed very high rates of growth, with
annual increases of 15% or more.
14 On average, banks’ portfolios of mortgage lending
doubled in the period between end-1993 and mid-1999. At the same time, housing prices
have shown a remarkable increase of 80% between 1990 and 1998. The combination of
rapidly increasing housing prices and the relatively high level of outstanding mortgage
debt as a percentage of GDP means that the financial risks for Dutch households have
increased significantly. This is especially so because mortgage loans have to some extent
been used for consumption and the purchase of securities, thereby stimulating both
consumption and the bull stock market. Important causes for the simultaneous increase in
housing prices and mortgage lending have been the strong economic growth and low
interest rates. These have ensured that households’ borrowing capacity has increased
significantly. Besides these temporary factors, more structural causes were also very
important, notably demographic developments, tax legislation (deductibility of interest
expenses), central government policy on spatial planning, as well as changes in banks’
acceptance policies.
15 All these aspects have influenced and reinforced each other,
thereby stimulating the rapid growth in mortgage credit and housing prices.
5.2 Modelling of the housing and mortgage markets
In order to gain more insight into the relation between housing prices and mortgage
lending in the Netherlands, we explicitly model both housing prices and mortgage
                                                                                                                                                
at the same time thinks that housing prices will increase further. Additionally, 49% of the population thinks that the
mortgage interest rate will rise further as well.
13 Note that slow market clearing can also be consistent with housing demand based on fully rational, forward looking
forecasts. After all, when the exogenous variables to the market move systematically, or if the structure of the market is
so that only gradual adjustments to the stock are possible, then even rationally forecasted prices can be highly
correlated over time (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1994, p.7).
14 De Nederlandsche Bank (2000
II).
15 During late 1980s and early 1990s, banks started to include second and temporary incomes in determining
borrowing capacity thereby increasing the permissible mortgage debt service/income ratio (the maximum proportion of
gross income that may be spent on housing costs). They also increased the amount of credit granted per unit of
collateral.-    - 10
lending. This allows us to assess the impact of mortgage lending on the housing price, as
well as the reverse relationship.
5.2.1 Housing prices
Based on our earlier discussion we expect that in the long run housing prices are closely
related to variables such as income and mortgage interest rates. However, in the short run
deviations from this long-run equilibrium may occur due to backward-looking
expectations and an inelastic housing supply. An Error Correction Model (ECM)
framework would seem a well-suited tool to model this, since it combines information
about the short-term dynamics (formulated in first differences) and the adjustment
process towards the long-run relationship (in terms of  levels). Our model is determined
in two steps, according to the Engle-Granger procedure. First, we estimate a long-term
equation, the cointegrating regression, relating the level of the housing price to a number
of variables including income and interest rates. Next we determine a short-term equation
in terms of first differences, including an error correction term consisting of the lagged
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In this equation the dependent variable is the log of the real housing price (rph). The
housing price is dependent on, first of all, real per capita income (ry). In as far as agents
are forward-looking expected real per capita income will also play a role. We have
chosen to proxy real expected income (ry
e) by a consumer confidence indicator referring
to the expected financial situation over the next twelve months ( FINSIT) because this
may also be interpreted in a broader fashion to include wealth (data on household wealth
are hard to come by for the Netherlands). A third independent variable is the real
effective mortgage rate (rieff), which is corrected for the marginal income tax rate. Our
preferred demographic variable to measure against the housing stock is the number of
households (HOUSEH). We experiment with two mortgage related variables ( MOR):
total real mortgage lending (i.e. the real change in mortgage stock, rm) and the ratio of
double-income households to all households (DIH). This latter variable may serve as a
direct measure of changes in credit rationing. Although banks formally started to take-    - 11
second incomes (fully) into account in the first half of the 1990’s, research by DNB
(2000
II) indicated that in practice most banks started to include second incomes in their
credit decisions some years earlier. Since the timing of these changes in informal bank
lending is not known exactly, we experimented with various dummy variables to
determine indirectly in what year this break in banks’ behaviour began to have a
significant effect on housing prices. Testing results suggested this to be 1990. Therefore,
we included a dummy (DUMMY90) in our model setting ln(DIH) zero before 1990.
Short-term dynamics in the housing price are modelled by relating the change in the log
real housing price to the first differences of the right-hand variables of the long-term
equation. The maximum number of lags is four, lagged variables with insignificant
coefficients being left out of the final estimated equation:
(6)
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In addition, the lagged change in the real housing price itself and an error-correction term
consisting of the lagged residuals of the estimated long-term equation (et-1) are included.
5.2.2 Mortgage lending
In order to investigate the role of housing prices in mortgage lending, a separate model
for mortgage lending is set up. The housing price may enter mortgage lending both as a
demand and a supply factor. Housing prices, together with income and the mortgage rate,
determine how much credit households wish to take out. At the same time, banks’
decisions regarding mortgage applications may also be influenced by housing prices,
which form an indicator of the collateral value of a house. Credit may be rationed. In the
Netherlands, the mortgage debt service/income ratio, which is the maximum proportion
of current gross income that may be spent on housing costs, plays a dominant role in the
supply decision, more so than the loan-to-value ratio which is not officially limited. This
suggests that the double-income household dummy should also be included in this model,
as a measure of  changes in credit rationing by banks. Since changes in the determinants-    - 12
of mortgage lending (income, mortgage rates, housing price etc) may be expected to have
immediate effect rather than to set off a lengthy adjustment process, a single-equation
model would seem more appropriate than an ECM. On the basis of the above
considerations a model of mortgage lending might look as follows:
(7) t
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The dependent variable in this equation is real mortgage lending (rm). (Lagged) forms of
the real housing price (rph), real income (ry), the real effective mortgage rate (rieff) as
well as real mortgage lending have been included. The equation is framed in first
differences to cope with the fact that most time series used contain unit roots (see below).
5.2 The data
In general, quarterly data for the period 1977:Q2-1998:Q1 have been used (1977:Q2 -
1999:Q4 in case of the mortgage lending model). The appendix gives a more detailed
description of the data and their sources. The time series used were analysed to determine
the presence of unit roots. Most variables (real housing price, real per capita income,
expected financial situation, real effective mortgage rate of interest, and share of double-
income households) were found to be I(1). Only real mortgage lending was found to be
I(2). However, from an economic rather than a statistical viewpoint one would expect
real mortgage lending to be integrated to the same order as the real housing price.
Therefore, real mortgage lending is treated as if it were I(1). Finally, the ratio of
households to the housing stock ln(HOUSEH/H) proved I(0). This suggests that in the
long-run this variable ought not play a role in the determination of housing prices.
However, the variation in the log ratio of households to the housing stock suggests that
this long run situation is not actually reached (Figure 1).-    - 13
Figure 1 Ratio of households to housing stock (logarithm)
Since we are in effect concerned with a medium long period we decided to include this
variable in the long term equation for the housing price, despite it being integrated to the
order of zero. Multicollinearity problems are not expected: no correlation between
independent variables exceeds 0.7, which as a rule of thumb may be taken as a cut-off
level (Table 1).16
Table 1 Correlation matrix
?ln(rph) ?ln(rm) ?ln(ry) ?ln(FINSIT) ?rieff ?ln(DIH) ?ln(HOUSEH/H)
?ln(rph) 1.00  0.30  0.28  0.16  0.34  0.14 -0.14
?ln(rm)  1.00  0.44  0.02  0.12 -0.01 -0.39
?ln(ry)  1.00  0.26  0.29  0.08 -0.05
?ln(FINSIT)  1.00  0.13 -0.14 0.00
?rieff  1.00 -0.15  0.08
?ln(DIH)  1.00  0.21
?ln(HOUSEH/H)  1.00
5.3  Empirical results
Our preferred specification is shown in Table 2. When estimating the long-term equation
for the housing price we found that of the two mortgage variables the index of double-
income households yields the best results. When included into the estimation together
with real income, the coefficient on total real mortgage lending proved to have the wrong
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Ratio of total households to housing stock-    - 14
mortgage lending as well as between the first differences in logs (0.93 and 0.44,
respectively) is probably the cause of this. However, when mortgage lending was proxied
by the index of double-income households, this variable turned out to have a significant
and positive influence on housing prices, even when the real income variable was
included as well. To us, this suggests that mortgage lending influences housing prices
mainly as a supply factor, with demand for mortgages adjusting to more fundamental
factors that co-determine the housing price, such as income and the mortgage rate.
Table 2 Estimated Error Correction Model of the Housing Price 1977:Q2-1998:Q1
?ln(rph) = -0.04 + 0.2 ?ln(rph)-1 + 0.2 ?ln(rph)-2 + 1.7 ?ln(ry)-1 - 1.1 ?rieff
                   (7.1)  (1.8)                    (2.7)                    (3.7)                 (2.0)
- 0.06 [2.1 ln(ry) + 0.7 ln(FINSIT) - 10.9 rieff + 4.6 ln(HOUSEH/H)
  (2.7) (4.1)            (4.9)                    (11.3)         (1.5)
+ 0.2 DUMMY90ln(DIH) - 19.7]




prob. LM (4 lags) = 0.06
prob. White = 0.08
ADF residuals (4 lags) = -3.66 (1% critical value = -2.58)
Explanatory note: The model is shown without seasonal dummies (absolute t-values in brackets). N = number of
observations, R adj
2 = adjusted multiple correlation coefficient, prob. LM = probability of Breusch-Godfrey test on
serial correlation in residuals, prob. White = probability of White heteroscedasticity test, ADF = augmented Dickey-
Fuller unit root test.
The lagged residuals of the long-term cointegrating regression, written out fully between
the large brackets in terms of the fundamental variables, proved stationary, supporting the
notion that the real housing price is indeed cointegrated with the other variables included
in the long-term equation such as real income and the real interest rate. Most long-term
                                                                                                                                                
16 Test results including lagged independent variables (not shown here) also suggest that there is no significant
multicollinearity.-    - 15
coefficients are significant at the 1% level, although the significance level is likely to be
overestimated due to serial correlation. Only the ratio of households to the housing stock
turns out to be substantially less significant. However, because of theoretical
considerations we decided to keep this variable in our estimation.17
All the coefficients have the expected sign and the adjusted R
2 equals 0.53 for the total
ECM equation (0.66 for the long-term equation taken separately). The error correction
term in the equation is significantly negative, indicating that in the long run the housing
price moves in line with its fundamentals. However, the adjustment process takes a
considerable time: each quarter only about 6% of the deviation from the long-term value
is corrected.18 Since the model is estimated in logs, the long-term coefficients (between
large brackets) can be interpreted as long-run elasticities or, in the case of the mortgage
rate, semi-elasticities. The outcomes show than an increase of 1% in real disposable
income will result in a 2.1% increase in the real housing price. Similarly, a 1% increase
in the index measuring financial expectations, the double income households dummy or
the ratio of households to total housing stock yields an increase in the real housing price
of 0.7%, 0.2%, and 4.6%, respectively. Finally, a rise of 1%-point of the real effective
mortgage interest rate induces a decrease of the real housing price of 11%.19 Of the
various long-term variables only real income and the real effective mortgage rate appear
to have a significant influence on housing prices in the short run as well. Additionally,
the lagged real house price provides some more short-term dynamics, indicating a
“sticky” pricing process.
Mortgage lending appears predominantly dependent on previous developments in
mortgage lending itself and on (lagged) housing prices and real income (Table 3). The
adjusted R
2 shows that our equation explains 88% of the variation in the amount of
17 Removing this variable would only have a very small impact on both the magnitude of the coefficients of the
remaining variables and their significance.
18 This comes down to an adjustment process of approximately four years.
19 However, it should be kept in mind that the real effective mortgage rate equals the nominal interest rate corrected
for the fiscal deductibility of interest expenses and subsequently lowered by the inflation. In most years the correction
simply implied dividing the nominal interest rate by 2, as the marginal tax rate for the average Dutch household was
50%. This means that a 1%-point increase in the real effective mortgage rate roughly corresponds to a 2%-point
increase in the nominal mortgage rate, implying that a 1%-point increase in the nominal interest rate would lead to a
long-run reduction in real housing prices by approximately 5%.-    - 16
mortgage lending, which is satisfactory. The results show that, when for each variable the
different significant lags are added up, a higher rate of growth in real housing prices or
incomes leads to higher growth of mortgage lending. Oddly, supposedly fundamental
factors such as the mortgage rate or the double-income household dummy turned out
insignificant.20 We take this as an indication of the complexity of modelling the mortgage
lending process (rather than the possibility that factors such as the mortgage rate are truly
insignificant).
Table 3 OLS estimation of mortgage lending 1977:Q2-1999:Q4
?ln(rm) = 0.00 + 0.4 ?ln(rm) -1 + 0.5 ?ln(rm) -2 + 0.1 ?ln(rph) + 0.1 ?ln(rph)-2
     (1.8)  (4.6)               (5.7)         (3.3)         (2.6)
- 0.1 ?ln(rph)-4 + 0.5 ?ln(ry) - 0.5 ?ln(ry)-2 + 0.3 ?ln(ry)-4




prob. LM (4 lags) = 0.74
prob. White = 0.41
Explanatory note: The model is shown without seasonal dummies (absolute t-values in brackets). N = number of
observations, R adj
2 = adjusted multiple correlation coefficient, prob. LM = probability of Breusch-Godfrey test on
serial correlation in residuals, prob. White = probability of White heteroscedasticity test.
The overall evidence appears to support the hypothesis that housing prices and mortgage
lending in the Netherlands are mutually dependent. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
in the short run, housing prices may deviate substantially from their long-run growth
path. This indicates that the Dutch economy is vulnerable to the type of boom-bust cycle
which it befell in the 1970s and which hit the UK and Scandinavia in the 1980s and
1990s.
20 One supply factor that did work was banks’ solvability (measured as equity divided by the total balance sheet).
However, we have misgivings about including this variable on theoretical grounds. Reduced solvability may lead to
reduced mortgage lending, but more likely so in bad times than in good times (in good times banks may well prefer
issuing new equity).-    - 17
5.5 A dynamic forecast of the housing price
In order to investigate how well our model of the housing price performs out-of-sample,
we executed a dynamic forecast with regard to the recent rapid increase in housing prices.
First of all, we extrapolated two independent variables ( HOUSEH and  DIH) from
1998:Q2 in order to have a complete dataset until 1999:Q4.21 Secondly, we estimated
both the cointegrating equation and full ECM on the basis of the sample period 1977:Q2 -
1994:Q4. In order to be able to forecast for the period 1995:1 -1999:4 we needed to
supplement the residuals from the cointegrating equation with the difference between the
actual housing price and the housing price forecasted on the basis of the 1977-1994
cointegrating equation. The results of our forecast on the basis of the full ECM are shown
in figure 2.
Figure 2 Actual real housing price and out-of-sample forecasted real housing price
(thousands of 1995 guilders)
Explanatory note: the out-of-sample forecast is based on the sample period 1977:Q2 - 1994:Q4.
Within sample the model appears to give a reasonable forecast of the real housing price.
A major exception is the housing price bubble in the late 1970s. According to our model,
the down-turn should have occurred a number of years earlier than it did in reality. As a
consequence the forecasted housing price significantly underestimates actual
developments for about four years. With regard to the out-of-sample period we note that
the forecasted real housing price follows the same trend as the actual real housing price,
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nominal terms equals NLG 12,800 over this period. Our model therefore suggests that
current housing prices are somewhat overvalued.
Figure 3 Difference between actual and out-of-sample forecasted real housing price
(thousands of 1995 guilders)
6  Conclusions
Problems of asymmetric information are relevant to the mortgage market. In reaction to
such problems banks may ration their mortgage credit supply. According to the credit
view of monetary policy, in which credit is “special” to households, this can influence
households’ financial capacity when buying a house. Credit availability may thus
influence housing prices. Since pledging collateral is one way of alleviating the
consequences of asymmetric information, housing prices may in turn also influence credit
availability.
To assess the relevance of this view for the Dutch economy, we estimated two separate
models, one for the housing market and one for the mortgage market. We found that in
the long run housing prices are influenced by variables such as income, the mortgage
interest rate, demographic developments and the housing stock. Additionally, changes in
bank lending criteria appear relevant. In the Netherlands, such changes may be proxied
using the number of double income households, since banks started to take second
                                                                                                                                                
21 Both the number of households (HOUSEH) and the double income households index (DIH) showed a very stable
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incomes into account only around the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, mortgage
lending was found to be dependent on the housing price as well as disposable income.
The empirical work presented in this paper thus offers some support for the supposition
that in the Netherlands housing prices and mortgage lending are indeed interdependent.
Our empirical work further suggested that in the short run housing prices can deviate
substantially from their long-run equilibrium value. The adjustment process to shocks to
the housing market may take up to four years.
In EMU, housing prices are not considered of direct relevance to monetary policy
decisions (asset prices are not accounted for in the ESCB’s inflation target). However, the
relationship between housing prices and mortgage lending may be of indirect relevance,
since housing price developments may influence consumption and therefore inflationary
pressure through equity withdrawal and wealth effects. Research suggests that the
interdependence between the housing markets in Europe is (still) limited (Van Rooij and
Vos, 1999). Thus, monetary policy decisions taken from the European perspective may
not be optimal on the national level in case of diverging housing market cycles.
Combined with the fact that according to our findings housing prices may deviate
substantially from their long-term value, this implies that national authorities should
carefully monitor developments on both the housing and the mortgage market and their
effects on consumption and inflation. In this light, more emphasis should be laid on
guaranteeing an even development of the housing market. Tax distortions and undue
government support of house owners should, for example, be prevented. Also, the
influence of mortgage lending on the financial fragility of households should be
monitored and banks should be stimulated to adequately price the risks that are attached
to granting mortgage credit. In so doing, idiosyncrasies on the housing markets can be
kept to a minimum, thereby reducing the adverse effects for these national markets of a
single monetary policy in the EMU.-    - 20
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Appendix Data and sources
CPI Consumer price index (OECD).
DIH Number of double income households (Statistics Netherlands), divided by
the total number of households, HOUSEH. From 1990 onwards on an
annual basis. Interpolated to obtain quarterly data. (Before 1990 only
available for selected years. However, in the empirical analysis a dummy
is used to set DIH at zero before 1990. See comments in text).
FINSIT Confidence index regarding consumers’ financial expectations for the next
12 months (Statistics Netherlands). Until 1983 polls were held three times
a year (January, May, and October). Quarterly data for this period obtained
by means of interpolation.
H Housing stock (Statistics Netherlands). Interpolated annual data.
HOUSEH Number of households (Statistics Netherlands). Interpolated annual data.
rieff Real effective 10-year mortgage interest rate. Constructed as the nominal
10-year mortgage interest rate ( Statistics Netherlands) adjusted for the
average marginal tax rate, t, and year-on-year changes in the consumer
prices index, CPI.
rph Real housing price. Constructed as the nominal housing price (Kadata)
adjusted for inflation by means of the CPI.
rm Real mortgage lending. Constructed as the change in the outstanding
mortgage stock (De Nederlandsche Bank) adjusted for inflation by means
of the CPI.
ry Real disposable  income per capita. Constructed as nominal per capita
income (Statistics Netherlands) adjusted for inflation by means of the CPI.
Interpolated annual data.
t Marginal income tax rate for married couples (two children) earning two
times the average income (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis). Quarterly data set equal to annual rate.